

AGA 3: Nuclear Disarmament and Global Zero

Zeit: Donnerstag 10:30–12:30

Raum: JUR D

Hauptvortrag AGA 3.1 Do 10:30 JUR D
Renewing, Reducing and Abolishing the British Nuclear Deterrent: Technical Opportunities and Obstacles along the Road to Zero — ●JOHN FINNEY — Physics & Astronomy, University College London, UK

The 2006 White Paper on the future of the UK nuclear deterrent argued that technical considerations required an immediate decision on renewing the Trident system. The following month, the global move towards a nuclear weapon free world was kick started by the first Wall Street Journal article by the US “Gang of Four”. This change in the external environment raised uncomfortable problems for the UK in proceeding with Trident renewal, while at the same time trying to establish a leadership role in nuclear disarmament. Although many of the problems faced by the UK government in renewing Trident in a world moving towards global zero are political, there are many scientific and technical issues that not only raise problems with, but also open up major opportunities for the UK taking a leadership role. These relate to not only to the renewal of the present system, but also – more positively – to addressing problems that must be solved if we are to achieve a nuclear weapon free world. Some of these are discussed in relation to problems of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, solutions to which would ease progress on the global Road to Zero. This discussion also highlights the problems of getting robust independent scientific input into security policy making.

Hauptvortrag AGA 3.2 Do 11:30 JUR D

Challenges and Opportunities for Russia-U.S. Nuclear Arms Control — ●ANATOLY S. DIYAKOV — Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT)

The past U.S. administration of George W. Bush was not interested in nuclear arms control. It argued that, with the end of the cold war, nuclear arms control no longer was necessary. As a result, from 2001 through 2008 bilateral consultations on the maintenance of strategic stability and negotiations of further reductions practically stopped.

A new step in nuclear arms reduction was initiated by four former prominent policy professionals Henry Kissinger, William Perry, Sam Nunn, and George Shultz. They emphasized a special responsibility of the U.S. and Russia, which possess about of 95 percent of the world*s nuclear warheads, in taking further steps that will reduce the number of nuclear warheads. Deep and irreversible cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are necessary to restore the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which the nuclear-armed states promised to reduce and eliminate their nuclear weapons in exchange for the non-weapon states agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons. This presentation devoted to opportunities and challenges to deep and irreversible cuts in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals: 1. implementing deep, irreversible, and verified cuts in the Russian and U.S.-strategic nuclear arsenals; 2. reducing or eliminating their nonstrategic nuclear weapons; 3. limiting ballistic defense efforts so that they are not seen as a threat to the other country’s deterrent; and 4. dealing with the U.S. conventional superiority .