AGA 7: New Weapon Technologies and Arms Control

Zeit: Donnerstag 14:00–16:30 Raum: HSZ-04

Hauptvortrag AGA 7.1 Do 14:00 HSZ-04 The proliferation of robot technology, autonomy and prohibition — •Noel Sharkey — University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

This talk will examine the ethical and legal implications of using armed military robots in the post 9/11 and Gaza conflicts and their role in the near-future. Concerns will be raised about targeted killings and lowering the bar for warfare - remotely piloted aircraft are already being considered an action short of warfare. Although there is cur- rently a "man-in-the-loop" for all lethal targeting operations, that role will shrink as autonomy is incrementally added. This is worrying because, autonomous lethal robots cannot discriminate between combatant and non-combatant targets, will not have battlefield awareness, will not be able to reason appropriately or make proportionality decisions. With over 70 countries now buying and developing the technology, autonomous armed drones could become the tool of choice in future wars. I will assess the technology, plans for its future and its potential impact on civilians. Military necessity is considered as a possible way to allow autonomous lethal targeting. Finally, I will discuss the available legal instruments for prohibiting autonomous selection and engagement with targets and argue that the only rational choice is a new international prohibition treaty.

Hauptvortrag AGA 7.2 Do 15:00 HSZ-04 Future Directions for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control — •IVAN OELRICH — Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

This presentation will review the current status of nuclear weapon re-

ductions under the U.S.-Russian New START agreement and some possibilities for next steps in nuclear arms control. Publicly presented proposals for future limitations will be evaluated to see how they enhance strategic stability and further the goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The presentation will then turn to the author's suggestions for additional approaches that will emphasize reducing the utility and importance of nuclear weapons rather than focusing primarily on reducing their number. How arms control agreements could be crafted to constrain nuclear weapon deployment will be described. The important interaction of nuclear offensive forces and missile defenses will be discussed as will the effects of the second tier of nuclear powers, France, U.K., and China. In general, arms control agreements should focus on reducing the alert levels of nuclear weapons, reducing their first strike capability while increasing their survivability, and making them useful for one mission only: to retaliate for, and thus deter, nuclear attack.

AGA 7.3 Do 16:00 HSZ-04

Raketenabwehr für Europa und die nukleare Abrüstung — •Götz Neuneck — IFSH an der Universität Hamburg

Die NATO hat sich entschieden eine Kapazität zur Abwehr von ballistischen Raketen aufzubauen. Im wesentlichen sind dies amerikanische Technologien. Rational, Kosten und Funktionsweise sind bisher nicht festgelegt. Als Grund wird inoffiziell die Bedrohung aus dem mittleren Osten angegeben. Russland fühlt sich durch diese strategischen Abwehrsysteme provoziert und droht die nukleare Abrüstung zu beenden. Der Vortrag resümiert Stand, Zweck und Folgen der europäischen Raketenabwehr.