Berlin 2005 – scientific programme

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AKSOE: Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AKSOE 3: Evolutionary Game Theory

AKSOE 3.2: Talk

Friday, March 4, 2005, 17:00–17:30, TU P-N203

Stochastic gain in population dynamics — •Arne Traulsen, Torsten Röhl, and Heinz Georg Schuster — Institut für Theoretische Physik und Astrophysik, Christian Albrechts Universität Kiel, Leibnizstraße 15, D-24098 Kiel

A standard approach to model evolutionary games is the replicator dynamics. We introduce an extension of the usual replicator dynamics to adaptive learning rates [A. Traulsen, T. Röhl, and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. Letters 93, 028701 (2004)]. Is is shown that a population with a dynamic learning rate can gain an increased average payoff in transient phases. It can also exploit external noise, leading the system away from the Nash equilibrium, in a reasonance-like fashion. The payoff versus noise curve resembles the signal to noise ratio curve in stochastic resonance. Seen in this broad context, we introduce another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to improve properties of the system. Such a mechanism could be of particular interest in economic systems.