SMuK 2021 – scientific programme

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AGPhil: Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie der Physik

AGPhil 1: Metaphysics of Physics

AGPhil 1.1: Invited Talk

Monday, August 30, 2021, 11:00–11:45, H4

What's so special about initial conditions? — •Matt Farr — University of Cambridge, UK

The early universe is thought to be extremely low probability in a way that calls for explanation. Some have used the 'initialness defence' to argue that initial (as opposed to final) conditions are intrinsically special in that they don't require further explanation. Such defences commonly assume a primitive directionality of time to distinguish between initial and final conditions. I outline and support a deflationary account of the initialness defence consistent with an directionless ontology of time, and argue that although there is no intrinsic difference between initial and final conditions, once we have sufficient structure to discern them we should not seek explanations of low-probability initial conditions.