DPG Phi
Verhandlungen
Verhandlungen
DPG

Berlin 2005 – wissenschaftliches Programm

Bereiche | Tage | Auswahl | Suche | Downloads | Hilfe

AKA: Physik und Abrüstung

AKA 1: Nuklearterrorismus

AKA 1.1: Hauptvortrag

Montag, 7. März 2005, 14:00–15:00, TU PC203

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Eliminating Highly Enriched Uranium: The Need for a European Initiative — •Morten Bremer Maerli — Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo/Norwegen

With access to highly enriched uranium (HEU) the construction of a crude nuclear device capable of delivering a yield in the lower kiloton-range, represent no insurmountable obstacle to non-state actors. The only real barrier nuclear perpetrators is facing are getting access to the fissile material. Some tens of kilograms of highly enriched uranium, depending on the degree of enrichment and the sophistication of the device, could be sufficient to construct a functioning nuclear explosive. The proximity to areas of potential nuclear leakage could make Europe exposed to nuclear terrorism. This threat can only be reduced by denying potential nuclear proliferators access to highly enriched uranium. The ultimate way of preventing proliferation is by eliminating as much of the HEU as possible - as quickly as possible. In cooperation with the Russian Federation, European parties should urgently consider eliminating stockpiles of highly enriched uranium by de-concentrating the HEU into low-enriched uranium (LEU) through down-blending at Russian facilities.

100% | Mobil-Ansicht | English Version | Kontakt/Impressum/Datenschutz
DPG-Physik > DPG-Verhandlungen > 2005 > Berlin