Dresden 2013 – wissenschaftliches Programm

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AGA: Arbeitsgruppe Physik und Abrüstung

AGA 3: Non-Proliferation und Safeguards

AGA 3.1: Vortrag

Mittwoch, 6. März 2013, 17:00–17:30, HSZ-04

Can State-level Safeguards be applied in Nuclear Weapon States? — •Clemens Listner1, Morton J. Canty1, Arnold Rezniczek2, and Gotthard Stein31Forschungszentrum Jülich — 2UBA GmbH, Herzogenrath — 3Bonn

Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) is a key element of IAEA’s State-level concept. Currently, this process is mainly based on expert judgment. However, the requirements from the IAEA state that the process must be objective, reproducible, transparent, standardized, documented and as a result non-discriminatory. A formal approach fulfilling these requirements has been set up by the authors in the past (see [1]).
In this paper, the refined methodology is presented. Improvements have been made in the interface definition between the three stages, the general network model has been updated, and the automatic visualization of acquisition paths has been accomplished. Furthermore, a prototype implementation will be shown.
Based on this methodology, a test case example is presented which models a hypothetic nuclear weapon State not having signed the NPT. For this case, it will be shown how APA can be implemented using the proposed methodology.

[1] C. Listner, M.J. Canty , A. Rezniczek, G. Stein, I. Niemeyer
A Concept for Handling Acquisition Path Analysis in the Framework of IAEA’s State-level Approach
Proceedings of the INMM Annual Meeting, 2012

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