Berlin 2015 – wissenschaftliches Programm
Bereiche | Tage | Auswahl | Suche | Aktualisierungen | Downloads | Hilfe
SOE: Fachverband Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
SOE 8: Poster
SOE 8.26: Poster
Montag, 16. März 2015, 18:00–20:00, Poster E
Evolutionary Dynamics for Persistent Cooperation in Structured Populations — Yan Li1, Xinsheng Liu1, •Jens Christian Claussen2, and Wanlin Guo1 — 1Nanjing University, China — 2Computational Systems Biology Lab, Jacobs University Bremen
In a public goods game, the total resulting payoff is divided equally among all participants. This still leads to the dominance of defection without substantially magnifying the public good by a multiplying factor. To explain the evolution of cooperative strategies, in a recent model only a portion of the total benefit is shared by all the players through introducing a new strategy named persistent cooperation. A persistent cooperator is a contributor who is willing to pay a second cost to retrieve the remaining portion of the payoff contributed by themselves. In a previous study, this model was analyzed in the framework of well-mixed populations. This paper focuses on discussing the persistent cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The evolutionary dynamics of the structured populations consisting of three types of competing players (pure cooperators, defectors and persistent cooperators) are revealed by theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. In particular, the approximate expressions of fixation probabilities for strategies are derived on one-dimensional lattices. The phase diagrams of stationary states, the evolution of frequencies and spatial patterns for strategies are illustrated on both one-dimensional and square lattices. We find that the existence of persistent cooperators greatly suppresses the spreading of defectors under more relaxed conditions in structured populations compared to well-mixed populations.