Berlin 2018 – wissenschaftliches Programm
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SOE: Fachverband Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
SOE 7: Poster
SOE 7.19: Poster
Montag, 12. März 2018, 17:00–20:00, Poster E
Compulsory Persistent Cooperation in Continuous Public Goods Games — •Yan Li1,2, Xinsheng Liu1, and Jens Christian Claussen2 — 1Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, China — 2Computational Systems Biology, Jacobs University Bremen
The public goods game (PGG), where players either contribute an amount to the common pool or do nothing, is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behaviors in biological systems, economic communities and other social systems. Since in many situations, including climate game and charity donations, any contribution, however large or small, should be welcome. Consequently, the conventional PGG is extended to a PGG with continuous strategy space, which still cannot escape the tragedy of commons without any enforcing mechanisms. Here we propose persistent cooperation investment mechanisms based on continuous PGG, including single-group games, multi-group games with even investment, non-even investment and non-even investment with preference. We aim to reveal how these investment styles promote the average cooperation level in the absence of any other enforcing mechanisms. Simulations indicate that the multi-group game outperforms the single-group game. Among the multi-group game, non-even investment is superior to even investment, but inferior to non-even investment with preference. Our results may provide an explaination to the emergence of cooperative actions in continuous phenotypic traits based on inner competition and self-management without extrinsic enforcing mechanisms.