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AGPhil: Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie der Physik

AGPhil 4: Quantum Foundations 1

AGPhil 4.1: Talk

Wednesday, March 22, 2023, 11:00–11:30, JAN/0027

Supervaluationism, Determinacy, and the Completeness of Quantum Mechanics — •Samuel Fletcher and David Taylor — University of Minnesota, Twin Cities

Putative instances of quantum indeterminacy provide important test cases for theories of metaphysical indeterminacy such as metaphysical supervaluationism (MS). A theory that cannot faithfully model these types of cases is arguably inadequate. While MS has had notable success in modeling run-of-the-mill examples of indeterminacy, such as those which accompany vagueness, it faces a challenge in modeling the peculiar behavior of quantum systems. The challenge goes roughly as follows: (i) MS models indeterminacy via quantification over possible worlds; (ii) those possible worlds require a classically complete assignment of properties to individuals; (iii) there is no consistent, classically complete way of assigning properties to quantum systems; therefore (iv) MS cannot model indeterminacy in quantum systems.

We believe that this challenge has not yet been sufficiently understood and that, as a result, there is considerable confusion regarding its strength and scope. Accordingly, our aims are to: (i) present a version of the challenge that is stronger, more general, and more refined than those currently in the literature; (ii) clarify the role that EEL plays in the challenge, as this is a persistent source of confusion; and (iii) show that the primary disagreement between proponents of the challenge and its critics reduces to a disagreement regarding the (in)completeness of quantum mechanics.