Berlin 2014 – wissenschaftliches Programm
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Q: Fachverband Quantenoptik und Photonik
Q 16: Poster: Quantum information, micromechanical oscillators, matter wave optics, precision measurements and metrology
Q 16.26: Poster
Montag, 17. März 2014, 16:30–18:30, Spree-Palais
Practical Trojan-horse attacks on continuous-variable QKD — Imran Khan1,2, •Nitin Jain1,2, Christoph Marquardt1,2, and Gerd Leuchs1,2 — 1Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, 91058 Erlangen, Germany — 2Institute of Optics, Information and Photonics, University Erlangen-Nuremberg, 91058 Erlangen, Germany
The functionality of an optical component inside a quantum key distribution (QKD) system may be probed from the quantum channel by sending in bright pulses of light and analyzing suitable back-reflected pulses. This forms the basis of a Trojan-horse attack [1]. We review the feasibility of such an attack, previously demonstrated on a commercial discrete-variable QKD system from ID Quantique [2], on a home-built prepare-and-measure continuous-variable quantum communication system. The objective is to read the modulation φA = 0 or π that is applied by the sender Alice to encode her secret bit into the quantum state |α⟩ or |−α⟩ respectively. By homodyning the back-reflected pulse, Eve can infer Alice’s modulation and thus breach the security of the system. We show the first results obtained with our attack.
[1] N. Gisin et al., Phys. Rev. A 73, 022320 (2006); A. Vakhitov et al., J. Mod. Opt. 48 2023 (2001). [2] N. Jain et al., (in preparation).